Patron–Client Dynamics and Client Autonomy in Asymmetrical Alliances: The Case of China and North Korea

Pyongyang’s acceleration of its nuclear capability contradicts Beijing’s regional strategic interests, yet the asymmetrical alliance endures. To explain this phenomenon, this article generalises the conditions under which a patron tolerates client actions that lead to diminished patron influence. When a patron perceives a threat as high, it is more likely to tolerate diminished influence, especially when it perceives a high risk of client realignment in response to pressure. Conversely, when a patron perceives a threat as low, it is less tolerant, maintaining strict control over a client who presents a low risk of realignment. This suggests that the pattern observed in China–North Korea relations from 2018 to May 2024 was consistent with China being less willing to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea, while also indicating that the relationship could shift towards a different outcome if Pyongyang’s opportunities for realignment increased.