This essay identifies, characterises, and discusses two objections to epistocracy, the Disagreement Over Competence objection and the Selection Bias objection. Both objections target an essential epistocratic conjecture about the possibility of identifying competent voters who would be more likely to vote correctly than a democratic electorate. I argue that neither of these objections is conclusive. In response, I defend a genuinely new claim, the Directionality Thesis. This thesis conjectures that the fact that society would adopt institutional forms endorsed by deliberative democrats such as open-mini publics would also be a move in the direction of some epistocratic institutional forms, especially epistocratic lotteries. Hence, institutions typical of deliberative democracy may help create the conditions for the justification of epistocratic institutions where the two objections discussed are largely neutralised.
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Cyril Hédoin (2026) studied this question.
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