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Epistocrats argue that public ignorance justifies epistocratic interferences with our political decisions to protect and promote the common good. In response, this paper shows that inclusive democracy is a more structurally stable institutional response to public ignorance than exclusionary epistocracy, whether justified with instrumentalist, paternalistic or jury defences. A Robust Political Economy framework helps to show why epistocracy is fragile. Epistocrats see that informed knowers are competent, but overlook that they are highly unrepresentative, which makes empowering them structurally unstable. An ignorant public does not know that the knowers are competent and lacks a peaceful way to oust unrepresentative politicians from power. This creates a competence/stability dilemma: either epistocracy prioritises a competent politics that fails to represent ignorant citizens and compromises stability, or epistocracy prioritises a stable politics that represents ignorant citizens but compromises the competence that epistocracy promises. This turns the democracy/epistocracy debate away from competence and towards institutional stability and feasibility. The problem is not that the public is too ignorant for democracy, but that the public may be too ignorant for epistocracy.
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Richard Beadon Williams (2026) studied this question.
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