Digital labour platforms are often celebrated for offering flexible work, yet women platform workers remain marginal in both regulation and legal scholarship. This article asks a single doctrinal question: when the law recognises platform workers without treating them as employees, which gender-relevant labour entitlements actually reach women? India is the primary jurisdiction. We examine the Code on Social Security, 2020, the Industrial Relations Code, 2020, the Code on Wages, 2019 and the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013, as operationalised by the Social Security (Central) Rules, 2026. Bangladesh, which reformed its Labour Act, 2006 through the 2025 Ordinance and the Bangladesh Labour (Amendment) Act, 2026, serves as a comparator that entered platform regulation by the opposite route. Both are measured against the ILO Decent Work in the Platform Economy Convention, 2026 (No. 193), read with the Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190) and the Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183). Using a doctrinal comparative method with a stated source-selection protocol, and a three-step test for regulatory gender blindness, we analyse four criteria: personal scope, maternity protection, protection against violence and harassment, and equality in algorithmic management and collective voice. We find that India recognises platform workers through welfare schemes without status, while Bangladesh recognises them through collective rights without social insurance; in neither jurisdiction does statutory maternity benefit reach a woman platform worker, because it remains tied to the employer and the establishment. Facially neutral qualifying conditions, notably India’s 90/120-day engagement rule, operate to the particular disadvantage of women, and of women in home-based care and beauty work most of all. Convention No. 193 narrows but does not close these gaps, since its social security guarantee is one of parity within the same employment classification. We conclude with prioritised, instrument-specific reforms.
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Dungdung et al. (2026) studied this question.
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