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Computation of Nash equilibria is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, yet exact equilibrium computation is PPAD-complete even for two-player games. This hardness motivates the study of polynomial-time algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria. While substantial progress has been made for two-player and three-player games, existing algorithms for general m-player games have largely relied on repeatedly applying one-player extension starting from improved fixed-player algorithms. Such improvements can at best strengthen the classical $1-1/m$ guarantee to $1-1/(m-c)$, for some constant c independent of m. We break this long-standing barrier by developing an iterative algorithm that directly tackles general m-player games and achieves a (1-(σ_-ε)/m)-approximation for fixed $ε> 0$ and sufficiently large m, where σ_≈1.5867 is the unique root in $(1,2)$ of σ_³-19σ_²+27σ₊1=0. Our approach rests on a novel iterative descent-and-repair framework that allows multiple rounds of repair. At the heart of our analysis is a new potential function inspired by continuous-time dynamics, which certifies progress across iterations and ensures polynomial-time termination. Our results highlight the power of history-aware, iterative repair in breaking approximation barriers for multiplayer games.
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Tang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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