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Critical minerals have become a central arena of U.S.–China strategic competition because they underpin advanced semiconductors, electric vehicles, renewable energy, aerospace and defense technologies. China’s advantage is not limited to its access to mineral resources; its extensive control over processing, refining, manufacturing, infrastructure and supply-chain networks creates significant vulnerabilities for the United States and its allies. This paper examines how Washington and Beijing are competing to secure critical-mineral supply chains and how efforts to reduce strategic dependence can generate reciprocal threat perceptions and deepen geopolitical rivalry. It examines three strategically important resource regions— the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ukraine, and Greenland—to assess how resource endowments, political instability, infrastructure, foreign investment, and strategic partnerships are shaping the competition. The analysis argues that complete decoupling from China is neither immediately feasible nor strategically desirable. Instead, the United States should pursue supply-chain resilience through domestic mining and refining, strategic stockpiling, recycling and technological innovation, cooperation with trusted allies and deeper engagement with resource-rich states. The paper concludes that critical minerals are increasingly instruments of economic statecraft and geopolitical leverage, and that competition over their supply chains will play an important role in determining the future distribution of technological, economic, and strategic power.
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Abbas et al. (2026) studied this question.
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