SAE Cooperation Theory Special Paper: Changing the Game / SAE 合作论专论:改局

This paper reads the threshold of cooperation. There are two questions: I want A, you want B; how do I get a result as close to A as possible? I want A, you want B; how do we do C together? A game, as this paper speaks of it, is only a situation in which one end, in this undertaking, asks only the first question; this paper does not define the word for the discipline of game theory. The cooperation this series reads requires that both avow this undertaking and actually take part; this paper reads the stretch before the avowal: one end is headed in the 15DD direction, the other, in this undertaking, asks only the first question, and no shared undertaking has yet been avowed. It does not ask where cooperation in general comes from. 15DD and 14DD here are stances, not labels; at the operation layer this end certifies neither that the other is headed in the 15DD direction nor that the other asks only the first question; what he can recognize is only two things: that there is as yet nothing jointly avowed, and that the other's words and deeds do not yet show the second question. The end headed in the 15DD direction asks both questions. Within the game he reckons as usual and guards his own share; the gains given within the game do not exhaust the direction in which he changes the game. Changing the game is altering the conditions of a matter: who can do what, whose share hangs in whose hands, what words can be said, what can be avowed. The end that leans toward 14DD changes the game too, and may also bring about options there were not before; the difference lies not in whether one changes the game but in where the change heads. When the end headed in the 15DD direction changes the game, what it heads toward is making the second question one that both ends can ask; cooperation here is the setting in which cultivation may happen, not the source of cultivation. In changing the game only direction is reckoned: the game can only invite, and changing the game can only invite too; the share put into the game for the sake of changing it is not written as an account the other must repay. Deciding his direction for him on the ground that it is "better for him," or making him unable to refuse, revise or leave, is the shape of the direction of colonization; putting forward a proposal the other can still decline, change, or stay out of is not among these. Of the share handed over, what is to be checked is whether it has obtained a position that the end that handed it over cannot revoke at will: withdrawing it when the other does not act as this end expects can be exactly hanging the other's share back in one's own hands. Speech is also a step that changes the game: the paths actually open and the paths the other takes to be open are read apart, and truth or falsity does not on its own certify direction. After the game is changed, whether to avow is the other's; once avowed, it is read by the papers of Cooperation Theory; nothing is inferred backward in either direction. The end that changes the game can reckon his own gains, and can be glad for the other; what is to be checked is the step of taking the reckoned gains to declare an avowal on the other's behalf, or occupying the other's share on the strength of one's giving. Not every game is changed into cooperation: competition can be just competition, and when the two ends come together, the third person is checked separately. This paper interfaces with Follett's integration, Pettit's non-domination, Sen's self-imposed constraints, Schelling's commitment, and Brandenburger and Stuart's biform games; for Axelrod it points back to Paper 1. It does not prove that changing the game in the 15DD direction pays, nor that it does not pay; it does not prove that people ought to cooperate; it does not prove game theory wrong.