Blockchain-Enabled Coordination and Pricing Optimization in Closed-Loop Supply Chains under Information Asymmetry

This paper examines the effects of blockchain technology on pricing, recycling, and coordination decisions in a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry. A two-echelon model consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer is constructed, with the manufacturer acting as the Stackelberg leader. The main decisions concern the wholesale price, retail price, recycling transfer price, and consumer buy-back price, while market demand and return quantity are determined endogenously. By comparing four models—traditional decentralized decision-making, centralized decision-making, blockchain information sharing, and blockchain-enabled coordination—the study finds that recycling-information asymmetry reduces the buy-back price and return quantity, while decentralized decision-making causes double marginalization. Blockchain enhances the transparency and verifiability of recycling information, but information sharing alone cannot eliminate incentive conflicts between supply chain members. Introducing a coordination contract can reproduce the centralized optimal decisions. Blockchain-enabled coordination increases total supply chain profit only when its implementation cost does not exceed the critical value K ∗ . Under this condition, a fixed transfer payment can achieve a Pareto improvement. These findings provide practical guidance for firms in evaluating blockchain investment, designing coordination contracts, and allocating coordination gains.