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Over the past two decades, digital transformation has fundamentally reshaped the production, circulation, and consumption of political information. Traditional media are no longer the primary intermediary between political events and the public; social media platforms and instant messaging applications have become central arenas for shaping public opinion, political attitudes, and electoral behavior. While this transformation has enabled unprecedented speed in the dissemination of information and expanded opportunities for political participation, it has also created a complex information environment in which misleading and deceptive content can spread rapidly. Within electoral contexts, this has become one of the most significant challenges facing democratic systems because of its ability to shape voters’ perceptions of political issues, candidates, and public institutions. As a result, the integrity of elections can no longer be assessed solely by examining the fairness of voting procedures, vote counting, and compliance with electoral regulations. As citizens become increasingly exposed to misleading information, manipulated content, and politically motivated narratives, their ability to make informed electoral choices is diminished, even when electoral procedures themselves comply with legal and administrative standards. Safeguarding electoral integrity today therefore also requires protecting the information environment and ensuring citizens’ access to accurate and trustworthy information. This challenge is particularly significant in Lebanon, where political and sectarian divisions intersect with a highly fragmented media landscape and widespread dependence on social media and encrypted messaging applications, especially WhatsApp, whose private and encrypted nature makes independent monitoring and verification particularly difficult. At the same time, Lebanon’s legal and regulatory framework governing elections still lacks a clear legal definition of digital disinformation and provides limited oversight of political content and online electoral advertising. The rapid development of generative artificial intelligence and deepfake technologies, which make it possible to produce highly realistic audio and visual content that ordinary users struggle to distinguish from authentic material, adds a further challenge for legislators and electoral authorities. Existing Lebanese research has primarily examined digital disinformation from national, institutional, or media-monitoring perspectives, while relatively little attention has been devoted to how citizens within small local communities experience, interpret, and respond to misleading information. This report seeks to address part of this gap. It analyzes a survey conducted in the village of Kfarqahel to discuss digital disinformation and elections in a local context, and reads its results against an analysis of the Lebanese information environment surrounding the 2022 parliamentary elections. It asks whether the effects of digital disinformation represent isolated individual practices or reflect broader and more organized patterns, and what role political awareness, trust in media sources, verification practices, and trust in political institutions play in the relationship between exposure to misleading content and electoral decision-making.
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Moustafa Awwad (2026) studied this question.
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