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Legal persons are commonly defined as entities attributed legal positions, often a capacity for legal rights and duties, and divided into natural persons, if human individuals, or juristic persons, if another kind of entity. Although pervasive in modern legal theory and legislation, these tenets are recent from a historical perspective. I will argue that legal persons have been conceptualised differently and that the modern tenets are dependent on specific historical events. The tenets are therefore historically contingent. Rather than necessary features of legal thought, they are open to analytical reappraisal as well as normative and political reconsideration. The historical contingency of the tenets is demonstrated through an analysis of the meaning given to the term ‘persona’ and equivalent terms in historical sources and the author’s reasons for giving the terms a particular meaning. The analysis will show that the tenets are contingent upon their function in modern law as well as upon earlier conceptualisations. In conclusion, I will discuss the implications of this historical contingency for future legislative and theoretical re-conceptualisations of the legal person.
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Johan Hermansson (2026) studied this question.
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