Bureaucratic incentives shaped effectiveness of the one-child policy in China

Empirical research so far largely suggests that population policies around the world do not explain a majority of the global fertility decline1–10. Notably, even China’s total fertility rate declined little after implementation of the one-child policy in 1979 and 1980, but fertility then fell sharply by more than one-third during the early 1990s. Here we show that strengthening bureaucratic incentives under China’s one vote veto policy, which strictly prohibited career advancement for adherence failure, was instrumental in more effective implementation of the one-child policy, and in its delayed impact on fertility. Using provincial variation in implementation timing, we find that the one vote veto explains nearly half of China’s total fertility rate decline during the 1990s, driving fertility below the replacement rate. Increases in use of intrauterine devices (the most prevalent form of modern contraception in China) that were recommended by local officials were particularly salient. Overall, our findings suggest that population policy, when more strictly enforced due to stronger bureaucratic incentives, made a greater contribution to low fertility in China than suggested by past research. Stronger bureaucratic incentives under China’s one vote veto policy intensified enforcement of the one-child policy, accounting for nearly half of China’s fertility decline during the 1990s.