When guns backfire: Autocracy type, military spending, and the onset of mutinies

This article examines how different types of regimes are related to the occurrence of mutinies, or collective disobedience within the armed forces. An increasing body of literature has studied the causes of coups and defections; relatively little research has delved into the conditions fostering mutinies. We contend that personalist regimes have a higher risk of mutinies than collective autocracies or party/military-personalist regimes. This is because personalist leaders are compelled to adopt strong coup-proofing measures, which exacerbate the grievances of the regular forces. This aligns with our second argument that increases in military spending further heighten the risk of mutinies, as personalist leaders tend to channel resources toward coup-proofing rather than improving the regular forces’ status. The first argument is corroborated by empirical evidence. However, we find limited evidence that military spending influences mutiny. Our article highlights the importance of exploring political violence within the broader context of regime type, particularly in civil–military relations.