Rivalry, insurgency, and pro-government militias in authoritarian states

It has long been understood that pro-government militia activity and pro-government militia violence increase during civil war. Recent literature contends that pro-government militia activity also rises when a state is involved in an interstate rivalry. We maintain that the combination of these two threats may, somewhat counterintuitively, result in reduced pro-government militia activity in some autocracies. This unexpected outcome can be explained by differences in state capacity and legitimacy. Using Geddes’ categorization of authoritarian regimes, we expect a decline in the number of operational pro-government militias when personalist and military regimes are challenged by both an insurgency and a rivalry. Pro-government militia liabilities are magnified in this context and add to these governments’ already considerable cumulative hazards. Pro-government militia numbers will, in contrast, remain consistent in single party regimes in this same circumstance. Since party governments have ample capacity, well-known disadvantages of pro-government militias rarely pose a threat to these capable regimes. In a sample of 142 autocracies from 1981 to 2010, we find considerable empirical support for our contention.