Evolutionary Dynamics of Digital Transformation Within China’s Building Sector: Pathways, Thresholds, and Reverse Mechanisms

The building industry has significantly benefited from digital transformation, yet its advancement remains constrained by policy inadequacy, fragmentation, and complexity. This study contends that the formulation of phase-sensitive regulatory policies is imperative to accelerate digital transformation within China’s building sector. To investigate these strategic dynamics, we develop a tripartite evolutionary game model involving governments, building enterprises, and digital platform providers. Using illustrative numerical simulations, we identify two divergent yet ultimately convergent pathways: a company-driven trajectory facilitated by targeted subsidy-penalty mechanisms, and a platform-centric trajectory driven by strategic digital infrastructure investments. The analysis reveals that stakeholder strategies are contingent upon implementation costs and regulatory cost–benefit ratios, which critically dictate the transition dynamics between different phases. Furthermore, we conceptualize “reverse transformation,” demonstrating how fiscal misalignment can trigger strategic decoupling and systemic regression from mature digital states. Notably, the simulations illustrate a conditional, model-specific threshold effect: under our baseline parameterization, a digital tax rate exceeding 30% deters enterprise transformation. These values are illustrative outputs of the model, not transferable policy benchmarks. By bridging macro-level regulatory design with micro-level stakeholder strategies, this framework provides valuable mechanism insights for phase-sensitive governance, aiming to ensure the long-term resilience of digital ecosystems within China’s building sector.