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INTRODUCTION: Delusions occur in neurological and psychiatric disorders with different aetiologies, raising the question of whether they share mechanisms. METHODS: This narrative, theory-building review used targeted bibliographic searches and citation chaining in cognitive neuropsychiatry, predictive processing, person representation, lesion-network mapping, and neurodegeneration. Searches were updated through August 2026, with Capgras syndrome as the primary test case. RESULTS: The proposed framework distinguishes processing an experience, selecting an explanation and evaluating whether to accept or revise it. It proposes measuring these operations separately. It predicts that fixed conviction requires impaired belief evaluation, assessed independently of conviction itself. It also predicts that an accepted belief influences later information processing, which may reinforce or modify that belief. These proposals do not depend on any one account of the neural systems involved. CONCLUSIONS: The framework is conceptual rather than computational. It may guide assessment and research design, but not treatment. Prospective studies should compare patients with the same delusional form but different causes, measure the three operations separately and specify findings that would challenge the proposed roles of evaluation and feedback or show that relationships among the operations differ across causes.
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Michael J. Schrift (2026) studied this question.
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