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India’s Unified Payments Interface (UPI) poses a policy dilemma: sustaining secure, interoperable payments without undermining merchant adoption and financial inclusion. This article integrates two-sided market theory, transaction-cost economics, digital public infrastructure governance, and inclusion research to develop a framework for merchant discount rate (MDR) design. It synthesizes peer-reviewed studies and Indian policy and payment-system sources available through November 10, 2026. Reserve Bank of India data indicate that annual UPI volume rose from 131.13 billion transactions in FY 2023–2024 to 241.62 billion in FY 2025–2026. The September 2026 framework announced a targeted 0.4% fee for eligible merchant payments above ₹2,000, with exemptions and caps; however, implementation was deferred in October. Thus, causal effects of the new fee cannot yet be claimed. The proposed framework links effective fee incidence with infrastructure funding, merchant margins, acceptance decisions, transaction splitting, price pass-through, and sustained inclusion. Six hypotheses are developed alongside an empirical research design combining merchant panels, transaction-threshold analysis, matched price audits, and provider cost accounting. The contribution is a falsifiable, distribution-sensitive framework for policy evaluation. Numerical tariff calculations illustrate announced rules; they are not observed outcomes.
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Chetan Khanna (2026) studied this question.
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