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The ability to infer others’ mental states is central to understanding human behavior. Across four studies (total N = 827), we examined how facial information and perceivers’ conceptual knowledge structure mental-state inferences. In Study 1, participants identified 60 complex mental states more accurately from full faces than from faces with the eye region removed or isolated eye regions, demonstrating the importance of information beyond the eyes. Study 2 showed that mental states believed to co-occur were perceived as more similar in facial appearance. Crucially, perceivers’ idiosyncratic conceptual associations predicted their own facial-similarity judgments even after accounting for associations shared across participants. Studies 3 and 4 extended this correspondence from perceptual similarity to categorical identification: conceptually associated states were more likely to be confused with one another, both for standardized posed expressions and for naturalistic, unposed faces. On trials involving misidentification, participants’ unique conceptual associations predicted which incorrect mental-state label they selected above and beyond shared conceptual structure. Together, these findings suggest that inferring mental states from faces depends on both distributed facial information and the conceptual organization perceivers bring to the task. More broadly, they identify individual differences in conceptual knowledge as a source of systematic variation in how people read minds from the same facial expressions.
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Meshar et al. (2026) studied this question.
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