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The shift in the relations between the United States (US) and China from a tentative engagement to adversaries engaged in competition marks the defining geopolitical transformation of the twenty-first century. For about four decades, the strategy adopted by Washington was predicated on the liberal assumption that economic integration would inevitably lead to the liberalisation of China, hence assimilating it into the US-led world order. This paper argues that the breakdown of the engagement paradigm was not solely a result of China’s assertiveness nor simply a product of American containment anxiety. In contrast, the present state of ‘interactive rivalry’ is better understood as the ongoing product of that earlier failure than as the failure itself: neither government set out for this outcome, but both have sustained it since through a feedback loop of defensive insecurity, misperception and structural entrapment. This paper integrates historical analysis with developments through early 2026 to demonstrate how the rivalry has synthesised into a self-perpetuating cycle. The relationship between the two great powers has entered a delicate equilibrium where defensive initiatives taken by one side are systemically interpreted as offensive threats by the other, producing a Kindleberger Trap marked by a critical deficit of global public goods and overall international stability.
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Islam et al. (2026) studied this question.
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