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This article examines why intelligence institutions struggle to adapt when asymmetric armed conflict evolves into fragmented criminal governance. Focusing on Colombia’s post-2016 security environment, it asks how inherited security routines, competing intelligence systems, fragmented territorial authority, and operationally driven practices shape intelligence adaptation after major security transitions. The study adopts a qualitative conceptual case-study design combining literature review, documentary analysis, and eight semi-structured interviews with current and former intelligence practitioners. It develops a four-dimensional framework comprising National Security by Habit, Clashing Intelligences, Shared Sovereignties, and Stash Intelligence. Together, these concepts explain how entrenched threat perceptions, state–non-state intelligence competition, overlapping authority structures, and tactical fixation constrain strategic adaptation. The Colombian case shows that intelligence shortcomings stem less from information scarcity than from institutionalised interpretive frameworks and organisational incentives that privilege operational performance over strategic understanding. Effective adaptation therefore requires institutional reform and the capacity to reassess inherited security assumptions amid evolving conflict dynamics.
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Niño et al. (2026) studied this question.
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