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Recent speculative neuroepistemology has discovered an apparently inexhaustible source of scientific certainty: themetabolic requirements of having a thought. Building on predictive processing, the thermodynamics of computation, and theindisputable proposition that all toads are frogs, this paper presents a unified taxonomy of argumentative overreach. Ordinaryempirical observations, extended analogies, speculative neural mechanisms, and wholly unsupported philosophicalconclusions are shown to occupy nested rhetorical clades. At a critical threshold of technical vocabulary, Jcrit, the evidentiaryburden undergoes catastrophic phase collapse, allowing an author to infer another person's hidden beliefs from the mereexistence of glucose metabolism. We demonstrate that a neatly labeled circle, while visually satisfying, is not a researchfinding; that nonbelief does not become belief merely because a brain is involved; and that no known property of amphibiansresolves the semantics of atheism.
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J. D. Q. Sanchopanza (2026) studied this question.
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