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Italian defence policy is conventionally described as having turned south. This article asks whether that declaratory priority is matched by the way Italy actually allocates military resources. Drawing on MIDA, an original and openly audited dataset of Italian international missions (1949–2027), it separates three dimensions that existing accounts conflate – the institutional framework of a mission, its functional type, and the level of responsibility Italy assumes within it – and applies an explicit geographical coding rule that distinguishes NATO’s Eastern Flank from the Western Balkans and the Enlarged Mediterranean. The evidence reveals a structural decoupling that is functional rather than volumetric. The Enlarged Mediterranean accounts for the largest number of Italian missions (95 of 227) and for most of Italy’s leadership positions, yet not one of these missions belongs to the deterrence or air-and-missile-defence class. Conversely, every deterrence commitment activated since 2001 lies on the Euro-Atlantic Eastern Flank, where Italy supplies high-readiness capabilities but never assumes command. Italy therefore leads where it deploys lightly and follows where it deploys its scarcest assets. The finding qualifies the ‘Mediterranean Turn’ narrative: the turn is real in mission counts and nominal leadership, but hollow in capability class.
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Melella et al. (2026) studied this question.
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