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In representative democracies, elected officials are normatively expected to reflect the policy preferences of their constituents. Classical models of representation posit that voters select candidates whose positions align with their own and sanction those whose positions diverge. Yet empirical evidence shows that positional congruence between voters and elected officials is neither uniform nor guaranteed, making it an important object of investigation. Using original matched survey data from Italian citizens and Members of Parliament, this article examines the extent and consequences of voter–representative congruence. We find that levels of congruence in Italy are relatively high and, compared with earlier periods, suggest a more effective mechanism of representation. Moreover, congruence is positively associated with vote choice, and the salience that parties assign to specific issues amplifies this relationship, demonstrating that issue alignment and issue emphasis jointly shape electoral behaviour. Overall, our findings confirm theoretical expectations and suggest that the contemporary Italian party system represents voter preferences more effectively than in the past.
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Carrieri et al. (2026) studied this question.
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