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Kant argues that we can’t know the thing-in-itself or the self-in-itself. However, that’s not only because we merely glimpse the apparent qualities of things and selves through the glass darkly of our cognitive categories, but also because the thing-in-itself and the self-in-itself don’t actually exist-in-themselves. They only exist as co-incidental and co-evolving articulations of the long evolutionary-history of the relative signifying relations of exchange: e.g. energy↔mass↔ time↔space↔force↔particle and atom↔molecule↔gene↔cell↔synapse↔mind. “To exchange,” means, “to put in relation,” and therefore, “to signify,” the relative value of whatever is being exchanged and whatever is exchanging it. Here we arrive at the protean semiotics of exchange↔signification↔value. A radical theory of the evolutionary-semiotics of exchange, therefore, leads to a radical theory of the evolutionary-history of exchange which leads to a radical theory of the evolutionary-science of exchange. In this way a radical theory of no-thing becomes a radical theory of every-thing.
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André de Vinck (2026) studied this question.
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