Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This article develops deterrence exhaustion to explain how repeated coercion produces diminishing political returns despite military superiority. Applying coercive diplomacy and theory-guided process tracing to the 2026 Iran–Israel–United States conflict, it examines how Iranian regime survival and retained disruptive capacity generated limited leverage during the June ceasefire process. The mechanism connects coercive saturation, declining threat credibility, reciprocal vulnerability, survival narratives, and political bargaining effects. Findings indicate tactical coercive success alongside failed political imposition, creating a temporary opening for negotiated restraint. Non-submission can therefore become politically consequential without constituting strategic victory, consolidated regional transformation, or evidence of a stable post-hegemonic West Asia.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
AKM Ahsan Ullah (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: