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This preprint examines why Wittgenstein resists philosophical system-building while recognizing the role of systems in practices such as chess and mathematical proof. Its central distinction is between the rules that help constitute a practice and the philosophical descriptions through which we make sense of it. A rule can determine what counts as a move in chess. A philosophical account of that rule can clarify the practice, but its success gives it no authority to determine how every practice must be understood. The paper traces this distinction across the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Philosophical Investigations, and On Certainty, attending to changes in Wittgenstein’s thinking. It argues that philosophical models can orient inquiry while remaining open to revision as the cases they are meant to clarify change.
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Mumtaz Enser (2026) studied this question.
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