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The swift expansion of the digital economy has confronted the standard approaches to CCI’s merger control framework, specifically those that are dependent on assets and turnover of an enterprise to decide its economic importance. Asset-light digital enterprises may hold considerable competitive value via user bases, data, intellectual property, algorithms, network effects and innovation potential in spite of having relatively low assets and turnover. This creates a regulatory problem where acquisitions of such asset-light digital enterprises may fall within the ambit of de minimis or small-target exemption and escape the standard merger inspection in spite of their potential importance for competition. This article analyses the functioning of the de minimis corporate target exemption under India’s merger-control framework and assesses its ramifications for acquisitions involving asset-light digital enterprises. This article further examines the relationship which exists between Section 5 of the Competition Act, 2002, the de minimis exemption and the new Deal Value Threshold introduced through the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023. Specific attention is given to the requirement of substantial business operations in India and its pertinence to digital enterprises with substantial amounts of Indian users but comparatively limited domestic assets and turnover. This article further examines whether factors like transactional value, user presence, data, intellectual property and potential competition impart more meaningful indicators of competitive importance than traditional financial factors alone. Through a doctrinal as well as a comparative analysis, the article examines whether India’s merger control framework introduced after 2023 sufficiently deals with the possibility of competitively significant digital acquisitions getting away from the scrutiny while also maintaining regulatory and legal certainty. This article culminates by identifying the major challenges that persist in the application of merger-control thresholds to the rapidly evolving digital markets and suggests feasible approaches for strengthening India’s framework.
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Pratyaksh Sharma (2026) studied this question.
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