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Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) authenticate a device by its manufacturing variation, but cryptographic verification cannot tell whether a live, honest device produced a reading, letting replays, clones, and faults pass. We benchmarked our deployed detector, UnifiedPUFNet, against six baselines on 24 static random-access memory (SRAM) PUF tokens, holding out each attack family in turn. Test clones were real readings from other chips; replays and faults were simulated. Most detectors scored known attacks near-perfectly (area under the receiver operating characteristic curve, AUC, at least 0.999), yet five degraded on unseen families, UnifiedPUFNet included. We traced this to its input normalization, which removes each reading’s scale, where most of the attack signal lies. Our dual-signal variant restores it with a raw-magnitude input, holding AUC above 0.99 on unseen families and 1.000 on unseen chips, and rejecting clones and faults rebuilt from real readings. Two baselines and a training-free score ranked attacks as well, but the score collapsed under session drift, and the best baseline rejected more genuine readings on unseen chips; our variant did neither. Exact replays of older readings passed every detector, leaving replay to the protocol layer. Detectors should preserve each reading’s scale and be validated on unseen families.
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Cambou et al. (2026) studied this question.
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