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What drives a peripheral state to abandon strategic ambiguity between rival great powers in favour of explicit alignment? This article addresses that question through a single-case process-tracing study of Argentina’s Antarctic infrastructure policy, focusing on the Antarctic Logistics Hub in Ushuaia across two administrations. Under Alberto Fernández’s presidency (2019–2023), the project was managed through calculated ambiguity. Argentina engaged both Washington and Beijing in parallel without a definitive commitment to either. In contrast, under Javier Milei (2023-present), the administration aligned openly with the United States, actively excluded China, and reframed the hub as part of the bilateral strategic alliance. Drawing on hedging theory and the concept of acquiescence from Latin American foreign policy scholarship, the article argues that this transition resulted from the convergence of two conditions: a domestic ideological shift that redefined the normative boundaries of acceptable foreign policy, and intensified U.S. hegemonic pressure in a context of macroeconomic vulnerability. The article makes three contributions. First, it advances the literature on infrastructure securitisation in the context of China-U.S. rivalry. Second, it theorises the structural fragility of hedging practiced under regional hegemony. Finally, it identifies enabling conditions under which states facing external hegemonic pressure may recover strategic autonomy.
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Alejandro Frenkel (2026) studied this question.
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