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Research on chief executive officers (CEOs) typically assumes that a single leader heads the firm, yet some firms divide this role among two or more co-CEOs. Drawing on an integrative review of 28 articles published between 2002 and 2025, I synthesize what is known about why co-CEO structures emerge, how they function, and when they create or destroy value. The review suggests that firms adopt co-CEO structures when transformational change (particularly mergers), succession demands, or complexity exceed the capacity of a single executive. Outcomes studied in the literature vary considerably: mutual monitoring can curb individual opportunism, while shared incentives and power asymmetries can trigger agent–agent conflicts. Across outcome domains, effects appear to depend on the balance of power within the dyad, clarity of role division, complementarity in the co-CEOs’ backgrounds, and the ownership context. Relational, structural, psychological, and developmental mechanisms help explain why some co-CEO pairs succeed while others fail. Building on these insights, I outline a research agenda that calls for integrating agency, shared leadership, and upper echelons perspectives; moving beyond binary measures to examine different configurations of co-CEO arrangements; comparing co-CEO leadership across institutional settings; and extending the field into new domains, such as human resource management.
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Tim Heubeck (2026) studied this question.
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