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This paper develops a conceptual framework for understanding legal transitivity of norms and its implications for the design of administrative discretion. Although logical transitivity is binary, the content of said relation may be scalar. Within the institutional framework of this paper, the notion of transitivity is therefore used metonymically to describe varying levels of normative determination between legislative norms and administrative decisions. That scalar structure varies with the precision of statutory requirements and the openness left for further factual assessment. Because complete predetermination of administrative action is chimerical, intransitivity – and thus discretion – is an unavoidable feature of legal systems. The central question, therefore, is not whether discretion should exist, but what counts as an acceptable degree of it. Drawing on legal theory, constitutional law, economic analysis and legisprudence, the paper argues that assessing discretion requires a two-sided diagnosis: both the risks of excessive indeterminacy and the costs of excessive precision. The argument is illustrated through classic regulatory examples and developed through criteria such as information costs, obsolescence, rights interference, and democratic legitimacy. The resulting framework helps clarify, as a preliminary approach, when legislatures ought to craft precise rules, when they should delegate supplementary norm-making to administrative bodies, and how legal transitivity structures the constitutional balance between democratic authority and expert governance.
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Pedro Moniz Lopes (2026) studied this question.
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