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The EU’s Open Strategic Autonomy (OSA) framework rightly prioritises supply chain diversification and domestic production, but it overlooks a critical vulnerability: the physical transport routes underpinning Europe–Asia trade. Specifically, the rail corridor through Poland’s Małaszewicze–Belarus border crossing has become a single point of failure for a growing segment of EU–China freight. Rail occupies an indispensable niche (balancing cost, speed, and capacity between air and sea) yet remains wholly dependent on fixed infrastructure. Since the Ukraine war, the northern route via Russia and Belarus has persisted as the most viable option, not because it is safe, but because alternatives like the Trans-Caspian corridor suffer from severe capacity and operational bottlenecks. This dependence proved catastrophic in September 2025, when the Terespol-Brest crossing closed, halting roughly 90% of EU-bound Chinese rail cargo and forcing an abrupt structural realignment. The underlying problem is strategic: OSA addresses sources of supply but ignores route security. Meanwhile, Poland’s national interest in developing Małaszewicze as the primary gateway increasingly conflicts with the EU’s goal of fostering competitive alternatives. To close this gap, the EU must integrate transport resilience into OSA, accelerate investment in alternative corridors, diplomatically de-risk the northern route, and promote multi-modal logistics. Without these measures, supply chain resilience and genuine strategic autonomy will remain out of reach.
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Kociubiński et al. (2026) studied this question.
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