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Why did Russia enter the Russo-Japanese War inadequately prepared for dangers its naval officers had already identified in prewar wargames? This article examines two wargames conducted at the Nikolayev Naval Academy in 1900 and 1902–03. They anticipated Japanese initiative, Korean landings, command of the sea, Port Arthur's vulnerability, reinforcement delays, coal, reconnaissance, readiness and torpedo threats, but were less accurate about campaign sequence and outcome. Comparison with prewar planning, intelligence assessments and Klado's wartime and post-war criticism shows that professional foresight coexisted with fragmented institutions, competing assessments and uneven institutional responses. The wargames predicted the problem better than the war.
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Hiroyasu Akutsu (2026) studied this question.
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