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Research on corporate social irresponsibility and business ethics has yielded important insights into how organizational harm is evaluated, attributed, contested, and remembered. Much of this research, however, begins from the assumption that harmful organizational consequences have already entered moral awareness. We challenge this assumption by distinguishing the occurrence of harm from its recognition as morally significant. We conceptualize moral visibility as the extent to which harmful organizational consequences become recognizable to particular actors as potentially morally significant and, therefore, available for ethical evaluation. Drawing on institutional theory, we develop the concept of selective moral attention to explain how institutional logics differentially organize this moral visibility. We argue that institutional logics become instantiated through organizational routines, categories, reporting practices, and decision processes that foreground some harmful consequences while backgrounding others. As these patterns of attention become routinized and reproduced, organizations may learn what warrants moral attention—and what does not. Thus, moral visibility is neither uniform nor fixed: it varies across harms, actors, and institutional contexts and can be reproduced, contested, and transformed. By theorizing moral visibility as an institutionally patterned outcome and selective moral attention as the mechanism through which it is produced, this work extends research on corporate social irresponsibility, institutional theory, and organizational ethics. It redirects attention from how organizations respond to recognized harm toward the prior institutional processes through which harm becomes available for moral concern in the first place.
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Zientara et al. (2026) studied this question.
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