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We study farmers' crop insurance choices using a behavioral framework in which break‐even status serves as a salient, economically grounded, and empirically observable reference point. The framework nests the standard expected‐utility model as a special case and incorporates three forces: risk reduction, aversion to falling below break‐even status, and disutility from paying premiums. It yields sharp predictions about coverage choices, including bunching at the break‐even coverage level (BECL), defined as the coverage level where the insurance guarantee just covers total cost. We test these predictions using a survey of corn producers in Iowa and Kansas that elicits farmers' perceived BECLs, attitudes toward break‐even protection and premium costs, and their actual Federal Crop Insurance Program coverage choices. Coverage decisions display pronounced and asymmetric bunching around the BECL, with a sharp decline in frequency just below it and a smoother distribution above. Proxy measures of behavioral attitudes are also associated with observed choices in the predicted directions: farmers reporting stronger aversion to not breaking even are more likely to insure exactly at the BECL but not above it, while those reporting stronger premium aversion are more likely to insure below it. Using illustrative simulations, we further examine how subsidy changes interact with these behavioral forces and find that aversion to not breaking even may play an anchoring role that dampens the effects of premium subsidy cuts on coverage choices.
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Gong et al. (2026) studied this question.
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