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This study examines how a service-oriented manufacturing supply chain should choose among reselling, agency, and advertising selling models when an independent third-party provider competes in the after-sales market. We consider a manufacturer and a retailer who negotiate the transfer payment under each selling model, while the selected model determines product-pricing authority and the channel member responsible for after-sales service. The analysis shows that selling-model choice is shaped not only by product-market margins but also by the allocation of after-sales service responsibility. When the manufacturer has dominant bargaining power, agency is preferred because it reduces double marginalisation and keeps service provision with the more efficient channel member. When the retailer has dominant bargaining power, reselling or advertising can dominate depending on consumers’ sensitivity to lifecycle service utility and baseline market potential. The three models have distinct advantages: agency improves pricing efficiency, advertising allows the retailer to monetise channel access without service responsibility, and reselling may remain attractive despite double marginalisation when consumers are highly sensitive to lifecycle service utility, because retailer-provided service leads to a lower channel service price and the resulting service-utility gain can offset reselling’s product-price disadvantage. These findings suggest that managers should evaluate selling models jointly with after-sales service competition rather than treating them merely as payment arrangements. Firms often negotiate wholesale prices, commissions, or advertising fees as if these terms only allocate product-market margins. Our model suggests that selling-model choice also determines which channel member becomes the service interface after the product is sold, and therefore who is better positioned to retain lifecycle service demand when independent third-party providers compete for customers. In settings such as automotive after-sales markets, franchised dealers may sell products and operate service departments, while independent repair shops and other service providers compete for maintenance and repair demand. This illustrates why upstream selling arrangements can shape downstream service competition. When the manufacturer has strong bargaining power and a service-efficiency advantage, agency-style arrangements are attractive because they improve product-pricing efficiency and keep after-sales service under manufacturer control. Reselling may still be rational for a powerful retailer when consumers attach high value to lifecycle service utility, because retailer-led service can involve more aggressive service pricing and help retain service demand within the channel despite double marginalisation in the product market. Advertising provides a different logic: the retailer monetises traffic and channel access through a fixed fee, while the manufacturer retains product-pricing authority and service responsibility. The consumer-surplus analysis further cautions that a channel-side Pareto improvement does not always imply that consumers are better off. Relative to reselling, agency creates a channel–consumer win–win outcome only in a narrower subset of the Pareto-improvement region, whereas advertising’s win–win region coincides with its Pareto-improvement region. Managers should therefore evaluate selling models not only as payment arrangements, but also as governance choices that allocate pricing authority, service responsibility, lifecycle service profits, and consumer welfare.
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He et al. (2026) studied this question.
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