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This study examines how a service-oriented manufacturing supply chain should choose among reselling, agency, and advertising selling models when an independent third-party provider competes in the after-sales market. We consider a manufacturer and a retailer who negotiate the transfer payment under each selling model, while the selected model determines product-pricing authority and the channel member responsible for after-sales service. The analysis shows that selling-model choice is shaped not only by product-market margins but also by the allocation of after-sales service responsibility. When the manufacturer has dominant bargaining power, agency is preferred because it reduces double marginalisation and keeps service provision with the more efficient channel member. When the retailer has dominant bargaining power, reselling or advertising can dominate depending on consumers’ sensitivity to lifecycle service utility and baseline market potential. The three models have distinct advantages: agency improves pricing efficiency, advertising allows the retailer to monetise channel access without service responsibility, and reselling may remain attractive despite double marginalisation when consumers are highly sensitive to lifecycle service utility, because retailer-provided service leads to a lower channel service price and the resulting service-utility gain can offset reselling’s product-price disadvantage. These findings suggest that managers should evaluate selling models jointly with after-sales service competition rather than treating them merely as payment arrangements.
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He et al. (2026) studied this question.
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