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This paper examines how intelligence analysis is conceived as a form of knowledge that invokes two contingent and not fully knowable domains—the enemy-object and the policymaker-subject. Drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida and a reading of the inquiries on the U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the paper traces the tensions entailed by this paradoxical position. Specifically, it explores how such tensions are stabilised in thinking on intelligence by a distinction between art and science in which experience and intuition as the art of analysis form a supplement to otherwise scientific ideals of objective and rigorous methodology. This understanding of intelligence implies that the artistic must remain mystical, makes it difficult for analysts to deal with contingency, and conceals the politics involved. Yet, overturning the hierarchies of art and science cannot solve this problem. Therefore, the paper moves deconstructively through the tensions in these supplementations to explore how intelligence might be understood as producing a sense of correspondence with the world, rather than reporting on it. The paper thus seeks to contribute to the study of intelligence and to the understanding of how state order is created and protected through security practices.
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Petter Narby (2026) studied this question.
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