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Restrictions on political expression through social media expose a tension between constitutionally protected dissent and the criminal prohibition of incitement, particularly when criminal legislation changes between the alleged conduct and judgment. This doctrinal study examines statutory provisions, constitutional decisions, and the full 120-page judgment in South Jakarta District Court Case No. 675/Pid.Sus/2025/PN Jkt.Sel. It finds that the court applied Article 161(1) of the former Criminal Code rather than Article 247 of the National Criminal Code because the former was more favorable to the defendant. The court distinguished political criticism and emotionally charged speech from a specific post it characterized as encouraging arson, using the Rabat Plan of Action’s six factors and the three-part test for restrictions on expression. It imposed six months’ imprisonment, suspended subject to a one-year period of supervision. The analysis distinguishes the intent to publish from the culpable mental state required for incitement and separates digital attribution from proof of that mental state. Its contribution is a five-stage doctrinal framework integrating temporal legality, classification of expression, evidentiary reliability, culpability, and proportionality.
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Marina et al. (2026) studied this question.
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