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On 25 June 2025, Ukraine and the Council of Europe signed the agreement establishing the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (STCAU), the first international court dedicated to this crime since Nuremberg and Tokyo. This article argues that the STCAU rests on an unresolved paradox. Aggression is a leadership crime, committed by those who effectively control or direct a state’s action, yet the Statute suspends proceedings against the ‘troika’ (head of state, head of government and minister for foreign affairs) for as long as they remain in office. That immunity follows from a chosen jurisdictional basis, delegated Ukrainian jurisdiction: the Tribunal can reach senior commanders, but not the leader at the apex of the Russian power vertical while he holds office. A freestanding tribunal unable to reach its principal target deepens the fragmentation of international criminal justice without the gain in accountability that might justify it.
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Eugène Bakama Bope (2026) studied this question.
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