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After the fall of the USSR, Hungary was one of the first former Soviet satellite states to make speedy progress on the road to capitalism and democracy. However, after a tumultuous first decade of the 2000s full of scandal and the demise of the political Left, 2010 brought the reelection of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, a party that with increasing intensity turned the Hungarian political system to autocracy and authoritarian rule. By early 2026, Orbán had created a ring of oligarchs in the European Union (EU) member-state, and those oligarchs controlled much of the Hungarian economy. In a turn eastward, Fidesz party members colluded with the Kremlin, willingly distributing disinformation on Russia’s war in Ukraine and blocking EU aid packages to Ukraine, all the while utilizing EU structural funds for personal and political gains, overt practices of corruption that most Hungarian citizens were not blind to. In April 2026, with a nearly 80 percent voter turnout, Hungarians voted Orbán and Fidesz out of power and put their faith in Péter Magyar’s Tisza, a new party that ran on anti-corruption, pro-Europe, and ideologically conservative platforms. Now that Hungary has a new party with more than two-thirds of parliamentary seats, will it rid itself of the deeply entrenched political culture Fidesz maintained at municipal, state, and supranational levels?This article cluster brings insight to these questions, acting as a discussion starter in this new Hungarian political era. The works were first presented at the February 2026 Hungarian Studies Association Symposium on “Hungarian Political Culture: European Security, Human Rights, and Democracy.” The symposium featured scholars from several disciplines, inclusive of but not limited to those represented here: anthropology, area studies, gender studies, and political science.1Sociopolitical systems cannot change overnight because they are both political and social, and the legacy of the Orbán system is sure to be significant. Fidesz changed Hungarian law, policy, and practice, undermining the very ideologies of illiberal democracy. Although Magyar’s Tisza is working for system change that will help citizens to build a more democratic system, the party has employed and continues to utilize the same mechanisms that Fidesz did to usher in rapid legislative and policy change. Tisza recently amended the Hungarian constitution to oust the Fidesz-appointed president.2 Although that particular action will hopefully yield Hungary a president more familiar with the mechanisms of democratic representation and bring the member state into closer alignment with EU values, Tisza will soon need to implement more democratic mechanisms by which to enact change if it hopes to continue to encourage rule by and for the Hungarian people—not by and for itself.All works in this article cluster, in different ways, address sociopolitical transition and the many challenges ahead of Tisza. Katalin Fábián provides an overview of the period of political transition in Hungary. After a review of the development of autocracy and its dissolution, she addresses both the domestic and international mechanisms of the Orbán government, highlighting its intervention campaigns, use and reappropriation of faith discourses, and economic backing of influencers—placed in the role of the oft-tropified “useful idiot.” In expounding on Fidesz’s anti-gender policies and their consequences, Fábián notes that Tisza has utilized and may continue to promote anti-LGBTQ+ discourse. If Tisza intends to keep its promise to Hungarian citizens of moving the state to align with democratic values of the Union, the party will also have to address existing anti-feminism and anti-LGBTQ+ attitudes in-house.In an exploration of the semiotics of disinformation under Fidesz, I investigate how a state-sponsored disinformation campaign functioned, and how Orbán used the text Soros-terv [Soros plan] to channel authority to his party. It will be a challenge for Tisza to communicate with Fidesz supporters, as the discursive world Orbán and his party created and maintained for them is antithetical to the worldview Magyar presents. Orbán offered supporters simplistic, assuring explanations for complex political happenings. He did this while manufacturing a superconspiracy theory and its villain—a mainstreamed conspiracy theory that will not disappear with the implementation of new media laws. Oana Armeanu addresses parallels between the emergence of Fidesz and the emergence of Tisza, while also explaining how the parties and their strategies differ. She analyzes the governing style of both parties and the effects those chosen styles might have on the future development of political culture in Hungary, particularly the use of populist elements (like naming an enemy elite), charismatic leadership, and the generational gap that played a significant role in the last election cycle.In other words, the political culture in which Fidesz thrived cannot just be pushed from office as its central propagator was. On July 7, 2026, the Tisza government disrupted the broadcast streams of M1, one of Hungary’s main public broadcasting television networks, and Kossuth Radio, one of Hungary’s premiere news radio stations—both previously trusted by many Fidesz supporters. When broadcasts ceased on M1, the message on screen read, “Public media should not lie. We apologize for having done so for many years! Public media is currently being transformed to ensure that in the future it remains trustworthy and independent. News services are temporarily suspended. Please stay with us!”3 While this disruption can be interpreted as evidence that Tisza is abiding by a campaign promise to put a stop to Fidesz’s relentless and harmful propaganda—and to hold those responsible to task—many Fidesz supporters see the disruption as evidence that Tisza is the party suppressing free speech and overtly controlling media outlets. Fidesz, diminished but still active, called the move evidence of Magyar’s “tyranny,” discourse that continues to help shape its supporters’ interpretation of events.4 And so, in the battle between authoritarian and democratic systems, it seems Hungary is the state to watch, as there is much uncharted ground ahead.
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Jessica R. Storey-Nagy (2026) studied this question.
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