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Management fees are the central price in delegated asset management, but their effect on mutual fund flows is hard to identify because fee levels may reflect unobserved quality and changing demand. We study fee changes instead of fee levels. Our laboratory is the Israeli mutual fund industry, a retail-dominated, bank-distributed market in which every management fee change must be publicly announced. Combining hand-collected announcements of all fee changes with daily fund-level flows for 2012–2020, we find that responses concentrate in the days around the announcement: fee increases are followed by cumulative net outflows of about 10 percent of assets over one hundred trading days, and fee cuts by inflows of about 35 percent. Two quasi-natural experiments (a 2016 regulatory restriction that confined fee increases to the first days of the year and forced the repricing of zero-fee funds into the open, and the 2013 distribution fee reform, a counterpart of the UK Retail Distribution Review and the MiFID II inducement rules), an instrumental variable based on fee changes of other funds in the same family, and a battery of falsification tests suggest a causal relation between fee changes and flows. The evidence points to investor attention to salient repricing, rather than smooth price elasticity, as the operative mechanism. Finally, using unique inflow and outflow data and proprietary data on individual holdings of mutual funds, we find that fee increases affect net flows first and foremost through their negative impact on additional investments by existing investors.
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Mugerman et al. (2026) studied this question.
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