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European governments increasingly turn to total defence and whole-of-society approaches in response to hybrid threats. Despite their policy prominence, the practical operation of such approaches remains insufficiently examined, particularly within the complex maritime infrastructural domain. This article investigates the functioning of maritime total defence through an empirical study of the Norwegian total defence model in the maritime domain in the aftermath of the 2022 Nord Stream sabotage. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with actors involved in the Norwegian maritime total defence, we identify key strengths, including established coordination structures, legal frameworks, corporate capabilities and relational dynamics, as well as persistent barriers relating to classified information sharing, organisational differences, legal ambiguity, structural challenges and role ambiguity in high-end crises. The article advances total defence scholarship in two ways. First, it clarifies total defence’s distinctive character as the governance of a fused civil-military sphere, in which civilian and military actors, mandates and capabilities are structurally integrated rather than merely coordinated. Second, it conceptualises total defence as a contingent governance strategy whose performance depends on institutional histories, legal architectures, organisational cultures and shifting threat environments rather than the model itself. These insights offer analytical categories for comparative research on total defence beyond the Norwegian case.
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Hansen et al. (2026) studied this question.
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