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This article examines constitutionalism in the Maghreb through Italo Mereu’s concept of the “self-negating norm,” whereby constitutional rights are formally guaranteed yet systematically limited through legal mechanisms embedded within the same constitutional order. Using a comparative analysis of Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia, the study explores how constitutional guarantees are neutralized by executive discretion, legislative reservations, emergency powers, and broad concepts, such as national security, public order, morality, and constitutional identity. It argues that constitutional self-negation operates not only through constitutional texts but also through ordinary legislation and administrative practice. Rather than viewing Maghrebi constitutions as failed or merely symbolic, the article demonstrates that they function as adaptive instruments of governance, preserving the language of rights while institutionalizing their reversible and conditional application.
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Francesco Tamburini (2026) studied this question.
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