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The stable operation of the green building material supply chain (GBMSC) is important for the construction industry’s low-carbon transition. Although blockchain-based traceability is expected to improve information transparency in GBMSC, existing studies have paid limited attention to prechain information falsification and to the strategic interactions among multiple stakeholders. To address this gap, this study develops an evolutionary game model involving three parties: upstream green building material (GBM) suppliers, blockchain-enabled platforms, and downstream construction enterprises (CEs). The model incorporates platform verification cost, verification rate, reputation-based rewards and penalties, and market demand-price dynamics. The results show that (1) the evolutionarily stable strategy depends on the balance between governance cost and benefit, especially the platform’s ability to maintain reasonable verification cost and adjust verification intensity according to CE’s credibility; (2) reputation mechanisms effectively constrain CE’s opportunism, but have limited influence on suppliers and platforms, whose behaviors are more strongly shaped by compliance, collusion, and supervision incentives; and (3) high market demand and high prices increase the likelihood of CE opportunism. Based on these findings, the study offers mechanism-based insights for platform-mediated GBM procurement and provides managerial implications for verification design, procurement governance, and risk control in emerging digital procurement environments.
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Tang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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