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Why do some U.S. military interventions exhibit clearly articulated goals and modest troop commitments, while others pursue ambiguous missions with expansive deployments? This paper argues that variation in intervention design is not merely a function of external threat—domestic institutional configurations systematically shape it, particularly alignment between the executive and the legislature. I develop a theory of institutional precision, arguing that contrary to conventional wisdom, it is unified government that enables strategic ambiguity, while divided government compels presidents to adopt clearer goals as a political risk-management strategy. Drawing on an original dataset of 78 post-Cold War U.S. military interventions (1993–2022), our statistical analysis reveals that divided government consistently correlates with higher goal clarity and lower troop levels. Mediation analysis further shows that goal clarity serves as a key mechanism through which institutional constraints affect operational scale. These findings challenge prevailing theories by reconceptualizing intervention design as a process of constrained optimization, offering new insights into how democratic institutions shape the very architecture of force projection.
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Miao Wang (2026) studied this question.
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