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How does district magnitude (DM) shape the electoral value of incumbency, campaign spending, and term-limited retirements under open-list proportional representation (OLPR)? We address this question using data on 2686 candidates in Chile’s Chamber of Deputies elections (2013–2021), a period that includes an electoral reform that replaced two-member districts with districts electing between three and eight seats. We examine how within-system DM variation moderated candidate-level advantages while holding constant OLPR and D’Hondt seat allocation. Incumbency and campaign spending were consistently associated with higher vote shares and greater probabilities of winning seats, while spending had diminishing marginal returns. DM conditioned these advantages. Larger districts reduced the vote-share advantage of incumbents, but not their probability of winning seats. Campaign spending did not become more valuable in higher DMs. Term-limited retirements created electoral opportunities, but they did not increase the re-election prospects of other incumbents. DM reshaped, but did not eliminate, candidate-centered competition under OLPR.
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Ramírez et al. (2026) studied this question.
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