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Savage’s normative model of rational decision-making is deficient because the Sure-thing Postulate systematically ignores important information contained in lotteries. Useful statistical facts about lotteries, such as their modes and medians, are available as defeasible reasons for reasoned choices between lotteries. Because such summary statistics are holistic properties of lotteries, we can find cases where appealing to facts about modes and medians as normative reasons for choosing between lotteries conflicts with Savage’s Sure-thing Postulate. Such cases show the Sure-thing Postulate to be implausible and undermine both Savage’s argument for subjective expected utility theory and his argument for Bayesian subjective probabilism.
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Andrew Kernohan (2026) studied this question.
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