Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This analysis reveals sequences of binding and non-binding agreements in space governance, indicating that power asymmetry and trust levels significantly influence these arrangements.
Two states can have several bilateral agreements between them, some of which are legally binding and others are not. Is there a discernible pattern to how states structure the chronological sequence of binding and non-binding agreements governing a specific issue area? For example, do states prioritise a framework treaty to establish the foundation of their cooperation and let bureaucrats iron out details in non-binding instruments? Or do they first experiment with low-commitment agreements before eventually settling on a more permanent treaty? This paper explores these questions using the example of space governance, which is characterised by a high number of bilateral agreements. Examining space agreements between 287 state dyads, it argues that a combination of power asymmetry and trust levels influences the likelihood of certain types of sequences of binding and non-binding agreements. These findings are particularly relevant to the literature on informal governance, regime complexes, and space politics.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Morin et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: