The Optimal Cooperation Model of a New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain With Asymmetric Quality Information

This paper investigates the optimal cooperation model of a new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain comprising one NEV manufacturer and one power battery supplier. Considering asymmetric quality information, this paper develops the signaling game and the Stackelberg game to compare three cooperation models: the wholesale model, the joint venture model, and the patent licensing model. The results show that (1) under the wholesale model with asymmetric quality information, the separating equilibrium is a stable dominant equilibrium. The H‐type supplier may upwardly distort the wholesale price to separate from the L‐type supplier. (2) Compared with the wholesale model, the joint venture model and the patent licensing model may not be better. The choice of the optimal cooperation model is related to the cost of the high‐quality power battery, the joint venture share, and the fixed patent licensing fee. (3) The information sharing enables Pareto improvements in the ex‐ante profits. Furthermore, government subsidies can stimulate consumption and enhance ex‐ante profits, but their effects vary substantially across different cooperation models.