Robert Merton and Jürgen Habermas: The cudos Norms and Free Argumentative Dialogue

In the book Science Studies as Naturalized Philosophy , Finn Collin deals with a long-term tendency toward conflict between, on the one hand, a philosophical understanding of scientific cognition and, on the other hand, the empirical science studies that include the cognitive content of sciences as an explanandum. Collin singles out Robert Merton as an advocate of a division of labor that avoids this conflict by delimiting the sociology of science to deal only with the social framework and genesis of science, leaving it to philosophy and epistemology to investigate the justification of truth value and demarcation criteria. In this article, I will focus on Merton’s cudos norms and illuminate their meta-theoretical basis through the inclusion of Habermas’s ideas about rationality, the ‘ideal speech situation,’ his formal pragmatics, and his use of rational reconstruction. I discuss whether this can be considered ‘naturalized philosophy.’